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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Mr. Sams was charged with felony aggravated assault and use of a deadly 
weapon in the commission of a crime.  Following his jury trial, a jury found Mr. Sams 
guilty of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor disturbing the peace.  On appeal, 
Mr. Sams asserts the district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of a 
standoff between Mr. Sams and police that occurred after the alleged incident at issue. 
The standoff evidence was Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”) evidence of 
other acts, and was inadmissible because the State failed to serve notice.  The district 
court admitted the evidence on the basis it was not Rule 404(b) evidence, but the court 
had earlier ruled the standoff was Rule 404(b) evidence. 
   
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 The State charged Mr. Sams by Information with aggravated assault, felony, in 
violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-901(b) and 18-905(a), and use of a deadly weapon in the 
commission of a crime, felony, in violation of I.C. § 19-2520.  (R., pp.30-31.)  Mr. Sams 
entered a not guilty plea to the charges.  (R., p.33.) 
 Mr. Sams exercised his right to a jury trial.  (See R., pp.118-24, 126-29.)  At 
Mr. Sams’ jury trial, the following facts were adduced.  Mr. Sams and Travis Ohlsson 
had known each other for a few years (Tr., p.128, L.24 – p.129, L.3, p.262, L.24 – 
p.263, L.10), and they arranged using the app Grindr that Mr. Ohlsson would spend a 
weekend at Mr. Sams’ residence.  (Tr., p.156, L.3 – p.157, L.9, p.262, L.13 – p.264, L.4, 
p.268, L.25 – p.269, L.9.)  Mr. Sams testified that he expected they would have sex 
(Tr., p.269, Ls.10-12), but Mr. Ohlsson testified he asked to hang out and needed a 
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place to stay.  (Tr., p.157, Ls.10-17.)  Mr. Sams testified he and Mr. Ohlsson had sex 
and got high after Mr. Ohlsson arrived at the house.  (Tr., p.269, Ls.13-24.)  While 
Mr. Ohlsson testified he did not have any sexual contact with Mr. Sams (Tr., p.159, 
Ls.8-12), Officer Andrew Linn of the Boise Police Department testified Mr. Ohlsson told 
him there was some sexual contact.  (Tr., p.227, L.22 – p.228, L.8.)  Mr. Sams further 
testified that the morning of the following Monday, he awoke to Mr. Ohlsson sexually 
penetrating him.  (Tr., p.274, L.5 – p.275, L.17.) 
 Later that morning, Mr. Sams noticed the box of his HIV medication had gone 
missing from his bedroom.  (Tr., p.277, Ls.8-22.)  Mr. Sams testified he confronted 
Mr. Ohlsson about the missing pills, Mr. Ohlsson denied everything, and the two began 
to argue.  (Tr., p.282, L.25 – p.283, L.6.)  Mr. Ohlsson stripped naked to show he did not 
take anything, and then Mr. Ohlsson turned violent and began to shake Mr. Sams and 
push him around.  (Tr., p.284, L.20 – p.286, L.12.)  While Mr. Ohlsson was shaking and 
hitting him, Mr. Sams grabbed his show knife off a shelf.  (Tr., p.286, L.15 – p.287, 
L.25.)  Mr. Sams told Mr. Ohlsson to get out of his house and give his stuff back.  
(Tr., p.288, Ls.1-4.)  Mr. Ohlsson then attacked Mr. Sams, and the two struggled over 
the knife.  (Tr., p.288, Ls.5-12.)  Mr. Sams screamed for help.  (Tr., p.288, Ls.17-18.)  
Mr. Ohlsson took control of the knife and held it to Mr. Sams’ chin, causing an injury.  
(Tr., p.288, L.22 – p.289, L.7.) 
 Mr. Ohlsson provided a different account of the incident.  Mr. Ohlsson testified 
Mr. Sams accused him of stealing the pills, but Mr. Ohlsson did not steal the pills and 
was unaware they were in the house.  (Tr., p.133, L.24 – p.135, L.3.)  Mr. Sams 
became agitated, and after Mr. Ohlsson offered to help find the pills, he noticed 
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Mr. Sams had a knife in his hand.  (Tr., p.135, L.4 – p.136, L.2, p.136, Ls.22-25.)  
Mr. Sams continued to accuse Mr. Ohlsson of stealing the pills and stated he would gut 
Mr. Ohlsson like a pig.  (Tr., p.136, Ls.3-21.)  Mr. Sams then told Mr. Ohlsson to strip 
naked, and Mr. Ohlsson complied.  (Tr., p.137, L.6 – p.138, L.8.)  Mr. Sams threatened 
to kill Mr. Ohlsson (Tr., p.139, Ls.4-8), and then lunged at Mr. Ohlsson with the knife.  
(Tr., p.140, Ls.13-15.)  Mr. Ohlsson tried to get the knife away from Mr. Sams, and after 
he got it, Mr. Sams started screaming for help.  (Tr., p.140, L.15 – p.141, L.10.)   
Mr. Ohlsson later noticed he had a cut on his arm and some scratches.  (Tr., p.146, 
Ls.4-11.) 
 Mr. Sams and Mr. Ohlsson left the bedroom, and Mr. Ohlsson left the house 
through the front door while Mr. Sams went to the garage to get a shovel.  (Tr., p.141, 
L.8 – p.142, L.17, p.293, L.16 – p.294, L.18.)  Mr. Sams subsequently threw 
Mr. Ohlsson’s clothes out of the house.  (Tr., p.146, Ls.3-9, p.294, Ls.19-25.)  Mr. Sams’ 
roommate, who had been in the living room of the house, called 911.  (Tr., p.188, L.8 – 
p.191, L.23.)  When the police arrived at the scene, they detained and questioned 
Mr. Ohlsson (Tr., p.150, L.5 – p.152, L.17, p.222, Ls.3-21), and walked Mr. Sams’ 
roommate out of the house (Tr., p.192, Ls.2-6).   
 There was then a standoff between the police and Mr. Sams for about five hours.  
Before the State’s opening statement, Mr. Sams requested the State not be allowed to 
go into the standoff with the officers, because Mr. Sams had not been charged with 
resisting and obstructing and evidence of the standoff was irrelevant and prejudicial.  
(Tr., p.109, L.22 – p.110, L.4.)  The State argued the standoff was evidence of 
consciousness of guilt and identity.  (Tr., p.110, L.16 – p.111, L.5.)   
 4 
The district court initially determined sufficient facts existed to find the standoff 
happened.  (Tr., p.113, Ls.17-19.)  The district court determined the standoff could be 
perceived as another wrong or act under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404, and ruled under 
Rule 404(b) the information was admissible for a non-propensity purpose including 
identity or the absence of mistake or accident.  (Tr., p.113, L.17 – p.114, L.2.)  The 
district court also determined the evidence was admissible under Rule 403 because it 
was not unduly prejudicial to Mr. Sams.  (Tr., p.114, Ls.2-3.) 
 Mr. Sams then brought to the district court’s attention that he was entitled to 
notice of the standoff evidence under Rule 404(b).  (See Tr., p.114, Ls.24-25.)  The 
State argued the standoff evidence was not Rule 404(b) evidence because it was part 
and parcel to the incident, and it was not propensity evidence because it showed 
Mr. Sams was not in the right state of mind when he refused to come out and speak 
with law enforcement.  (Tr., p.117, L.2 – p.118, L.6.)  In response, Mr. Sams asserted 
the evidence was prejudicial and irrelevant to the incident.  (Tr., p.118, Ls.7-19.) 
The district court recognized the State had not provided notice of its intent to 
introduce Rule 404(b) evidence.  (Tr., p.118, Ls.20-22.)  The district court ruled 
evidence that Mr. Sams was anti-authoritarian and thus had a propensity to commit 
crimes was prohibited under Rule 404(a).  (Tr., p.118, L.22 – p.119, L.1.)  However, the 
district court determined that certain parts of the standoff showed consciousness of guilt 
and were parcel to the facts of the incident.  (See Tr., p.119, Ls.2-5.)  The district court 
determined the police’s attempts to contact Mr. Sams during the standoff were not 
character or Rule 404(b) evidence requiring notice.  (Tr., p.119, Ls.9-15.) 
 5 
In its opening statement, the State told the jury it would hear about the time 
period before Mr. Sams was taken into custody.  (Tr., p.127, Ls.9-10.)  During the 
State’s case-in-chief, Mr. Sams’ roommate testified the police kept him away from the 
house for about five hours, and when he returned the house had been ransacked.  
(Tr., p.192, Ls.7-23.)  Officer Kirk Rush testified Mr. Sams did not respond to the 
officers’ initial attempts to contact him, but the officers eventually made contact with 
Mr. Sams and took him into custody when he exited the house.  (Tr., p.206, L.18 – 
p.207, L.14.) 
On direct examination, Mr. Sams testified he sent a kite out while he was in jail 
requesting a picture be taken of his chin, but a picture was not taken.  (Tr., p.289, L.12 – 
p.291, L.7.)  The State argued Mr. Sams thereby opened the door for inquiry into the 
police response and his communications with the police.  (Tr., p.297, L.16 – p.298, L.3.)  
The district court determined Mr. Sams had opened the door to his interactions with the 
police, including the police’s prior attempts to investigate the incident.  (Tr., p.298, L.17 
– p.299, L.10, p.301, Ls.2-8.) 
Thus, on cross-examination, Mr. Sams testified he had locked himself in the 
bathroom and initially did not know the police had arrived.  (Tr., p.305, Ls.16-22.)  He 
was unaware of calls to his cell phone about half an hour into the standoff, because he 
had no idea where his phone was.  (See Tr., p.306, Ls.14-22.)  About an hour later, 
Mr. Sams looked outside the window and saw the police.  (Tr., p.306, L.23 – p.307, L.3.)  
The police tried to get his attention with their PA system, and Mr. Sams subsequently 
went to the back door of the house and made contact with law enforcement.  (Tr., p.307, 
Ls.4-23.)  The police asked Mr. Sams to come outside several times, but he remained 
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inside the house.  (Tr., p.307, L.24 – p.309, L.23.)  At one point, the police threw a 
phone through a window so a negotiator could talk with Mr. Sams.  (Tr., p.310, Ls.4-17.)  
Mr. Sams was arrested when he eventually went outside.  (Tr., p.310, Ls.18-24.) 
The jury acquitted Mr. Sams of felony aggravated assault and of the lesser-
included offense of misdemeanor assault.  (See Tr., p.380, L.20 – p.381, L.13; R., 159.)  
The jury found Mr. Sams guilty of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor disturbing 
the peace.  (Tr., p.380, L.20 – p.381, L.2; R., p.159.)  
The district court sentenced Mr. Sams to 180 days jail time, with credit for 107 
days served and 73 days suspended.  (Tr., p.393, Ls.1-19; R., p.163.)  The district court 
placed Mr. Sams on probation for a period of two years.  (Tr., p.393, Ls.19-21; 
R., p.163.) 
Mr. Sams filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of 
Conviction and Probation Order.  (R., pp.168-70.) 
About three months later, the State filed a Motion for Bench Warrant for 
Probation Violation.  (R., pp.173-74.)  The district court revoked probation and ordered 
Mr. Sams to serve the previously-suspended jail sentence.  (Order Revoking Probation, 
Judgment of Conviction (Misdemeanor) and Commitment, Nov. 12, 2015.)   The district 
court later approved the request by the Ada County’s Sheriff’s Office that Mr. Sams be 
granted early release time. 1  (Approval of 5 Days of Early Release, Dec. 22, 2015.) 
 
                                            
1 Mr. Sams is currently not on the Ada County Jail’s Inmate Roster.  See Inmate Roster, 
Ada County Sheriff’s Office, https://adasheriff.org/webapps/sheriff/reports/inmates (last 
accessed Feb. 23, 2016). 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the standoff 
between Mr. Sams and the police on the basis it was not Idaho Criminal Rule 404(b) 
evidence, despite the court’s earlier ruling the evidence was Rule 404(b) evidence? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Evidence Of The Standoff On 
The Basis It Was Not Idaho Rule Of Evidence 404(b) Evidence, Because The Court 





Mr. Sams asserts the district court abused its discretion when it admitted 
evidence of the standoff on the basis it was not Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
evidence, because the court earlier ruled the standoff was Rule 404(b) evidence.  The 
district court excused the State’s failure to serve notice regarding the standoff evidence 
under Rule 404(b) by determining the standoff evidence was not Rule 404(b) evidence.  
(See Tr., p.119, Ls.9-15.)  However, the district court’s ultimate determination that the 
standoff evidence was not Rule 404(b) evidence was contrary to its earlier ruling the 
standoff evidence was evidence of another act and relevant for non-propensity 
purposes under Rule 404(b).  (See Tr., p.113, L.17 – p.114, L.6.) 
The standoff evidence was evidence of other acts subject to the strictures of 
Rule 404(b).  Because the State failed to serve notice, the standoff evidence was 
inadmissible.  The district court’s ultimate determination admitting the standoff evidence 
on the basis it was not Rule 404(b) evidence, despite the court’s earlier ruling, was 
arbitrary and outside the boundaries of the court’s discretion.  Further, the State will be 
unable to show the district court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Thus, Mr. Sams’ judgment of conviction should be vacated and the case should be 




B. Standard Of Review  
 
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse 
of discretion.  State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009).  When reviewing a trial court’s 
decision for an abuse of discretion, an appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry 
into: (1) whether the trial court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the 
trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 
598, 600 (1989). 
 
C. The Standoff Evidence Was Evidence Of Other Acts Subject To The Strictures 
Of Rule 404(b) 
 
Mr. Sams asserts, akin to the district court’s earlier ruling, that the standoff 
evidence was evidence of other acts subject to the strictures of Rule 404(b). 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that character or propensity evidence is not 
admissible: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.”  
I.R.E. 404(b).  However, other acts evidence may be admissible “for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.”  Id.   
The standoff evidence was evidence of other acts subject to the strictures of Rule 
404(b), because the evidence did not form a factual element of the underlying charges 
and the standoff occurred in the hours after the incident.  Contrary to the district court’s 
later determination that “certain components of the delay in coming out of the residence, 
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which are consciousness of guilt are parcel to the facts of the crime” (Tr., p.118, Ls.2-5), 
the standoff evidence did not form a factual element of the underlying charges of 
aggravated assault and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime.  See 
I.C. §§ 18-901(b), 18-905, 19-2520.  Section 18-901(b) defines an assault as “[a]n 
intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, 
coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-
founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.”  An aggravated 
assault is an assault “[w]ith a deadly weapon or instrument without intent to kill” or “[b]y 
any means or force likely to produce great bodily harm.”  I.C. § 18-905(a) & (b).  Section 
19-2520 provides that any person convicted of aggravated assault, “who displayed, 
used, threatened, or attempted to use a firearm or other deadly weapon while 
committing or attempting to commit the crime, shall be sentenced to an extended term 
of imprisonment.”  Thus, the standoff evidence that, after the incident, the police tried to 
contact Mr. Sams and Mr. Sams refused to communicate with the officers does not tend 
to establish any of the factual elements of the underlying offenses. 
As previously noted, the standoff occurred in the hours after the incident.  
Subsequent acts come under the purview of Rule 404(b) as other acts.  See State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 279 (2003) (holding evidence a defendant removed plastic 
bags from his hands later on the day he was arrested for a shooting incident was 
admissible under Rule 404(b), because it could be inferred the defendant was trying to 
destroy evidence, which would be relevant to consciousness of guilt). 
The State’s initial arguments and the district court’s initial analysis further indicate 
the standoff evidence was Rule 404(b) evidence of other acts.  The State at first argued 
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the standoff evidence was admissible to show consciousness of guilt and identity.  
(Tr., p.110, L.16, p.111, L.5.)  Idaho’s appellate courts have recognized consciousness 
of guilt as a non-propensity purpose for the admission of other acts evidence under 
Rule 404(b).  State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 917 (2015); State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 
459, 463 (Ct. App. 2010).  Rule 404(b) expressly lists identity as a non-propensity 
purpose.  I.R.E. 404(b). 
The district court then ruled the standoff evidence was admissible after 
conducting a full Rule 404(b) analysis.  “Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts when offered for a permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered 
analysis.”  Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.  “First, the trial court must determine whether there is 
sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact.”  Id.  “The trial court 
must also determine whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if established, would 
be relevant.”  Id.  “Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to a material 
and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.”  Id.  “Such 
evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and 
that the defendant was the actor.”  Id. 
“Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing under I.R.E. 403 and 
determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative 
value of the evidence.”  Id.  “This balancing is committed to the discretion of the trial 
judge.”  Id.  “The trial court must determine each of these considerations of admissibility 
on a case-by-case basis.”  Id.  
The district court ruled the standoff evidence was admissible after conducting the 
above two-tiered analysis under Rule 404(b).  The district court first decided “there’s 
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sufficient facts to find this did exist.  While [Mr. Sams’] not charged with resisting and 
obstructing, it could be perceived as another wrong or act under Rule 404.”  (Tr., p.113, 
Ls.17-21.)  The district court next concluded the standoff evidence was relevant for a 
non-propensity purpose, namely “it is admissible for another purpose including the 
identity or the absence of mistake or accident in this particular fact given the state’s’ 
offer of proof.”  (Tr., p.113, L.22 – p.114, L.1.)  Rule 404(b) lists identity and absence of 
mistake or accident as non-propensity purposes for admitting other acts evidence.  
I.R.E. 404(b). 
The district court then went to the second tier of the Rule 404(b) inquiry, 
determining the standoff evidence was admissible under Rule 403 because it was not 
“unduly prejudicial to the defendant.”  (Tr., p.114, Ls.2-3.)  The district court further 
stated, “[i]t is part and parcel of the offense, and he had not invoked his right to remain 
silent, so I don’t believe it is commenting on his right to silence.”  (Tr., p.114, Ls.4-6.)  
Thus, the district court initially ruled the standoff evidence was admissible after 
conducting the two-tiered analysis for admissibility of other acts evidence under 
Rule 404(b).  In sum, the standoff evidence was evidence of other acts subject to the 
strictures of Rule 404(b). 
 
D. The Standoff Evidence Was Inadmissible Because The State Failed To 
Serve Notice 
 
Mr. Sams asserts the standoff evidence was inadmissible because the State 
failed to serve notice.  Under Rule 404(b), the prosecution in a criminal case “shall file 
and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it 
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intends to introduce at trial.”  I.R.E. 404(b).  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that 
“compliance with I.R.E. 404(b) is mandatory and a condition precedent to admission of 
other acts evidence.”  State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230 (2008).  The Sheldon Court 
held that, “[b]ecause the State failed to comply with the notice provisions of I.R.E. 
404(b),” other acts evidence against a defendant was “inadmissible.”  Id. 
Here, the State failed to serve notice as required by Rule 404(b).  The district 
court recognized “[t]here was not an intent to introduce 404(b) evidence, which is 
actually required under the statute if it’s offered under 404(b).”  (Tr., p.118, Ls.20-22.)     
Further, the district court excused the State’s failure to serve notice not because 
of good cause shown under Rule 404(b), but because the district court determined the 
standoff evidence was not Rule 404(b) evidence.  (See Tr., p.119, Ls.2-15.)  Thus, the 
State did not serve notice of the standoff evidence, and the district court did not excuse 
pretrial notice on good cause shown.  Because the State failed to comply with the notice 
provisions of Rule 404(b), the standoff evidence was inadmissible.  See Sheldon, 145 
Idaho at 230. 
 
E. The District Court’s Ultimate Determination That The Standoff Evidence Was Not 
Rule 404(b) Evidence Was Arbitrary And Outside The Boundaries Of The District 
Court’s Discretion 
 
 By determining the standoff evidence was admissible because it was not 
Rule 404(b) evidence, the district court contradicted its earlier ruling that the evidence 
was Rule 404(b) evidence.  Mr. Sams asserts the district court’s ultimate determination 
that the standoff evidence was not Rule 404(b) evidence was arbitrary, and therefore 
outside the boundaries of the district court’s discretion. 
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Only after Mr. Sams pointed out the State’s failure to serve notice did the district 
court determine the standoff evidence was not Rule 404(b) evidence.  The 
contradictions started with the State’s arguments.  The State argued the evidence was 
not Rule 404(b) evidence because “it’s all part and parcel to this incident,” (Tr., p.117, 
Ls.5-6), counter to the State’s previous contention that the standoff evidence was 
admissible as other acts evidence for the non-propensity purposes of consciousness of 
guilt and identity.  (See Tr., p.110, L.16 – p.111, L.5.)   
The district court’s explanation of why the standoff evidence was not Rule 404(b) 
evidence at first appeared to embrace the non-propensity purpose of consciousness of 
guilt for admitting other acts evidence:  “I do agree that there is certain components of 
the delay in coming out of the residence, which are consciousness of guilt are parcel to 
the facts of the crime.”  (See Tr., p.119, Ls.2-5.)  The district court further indicated the 
standoff evidence was other acts evidence by observing Mr. Sams “clearly could have 
been charged with resisting and obstructing.  He’s not charged.  The State had the 
opportunity to charge that conduct, and they did not.”  (See Tr., p.119, Ls.5-8.) 
However, the district court’s ultimate determination that the standoff evidence 
was not Rule 404(b) evidence contradicted its earlier ruling that the evidence was Rule 
404(b) evidence.  The district court determined the standoff evidence that the police 
“made numerous attempts to contact [Mr. Sams], he did not answer, and, ultimately, 
they threw a phone through the window to try and make contact with him” was 
admissible “because I don’t think that that is character or 404(b) evidence for which they 
did not present notice.”  (Tr., p.119, Ls.9-15.)   
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But the district court’s earlier ruling was not so limited.  The State’s offer of proof 
included evidence that the police made multiple attempts to contact Mr. Sams and threw 
a phone through a window to contact him.  (Tr., p.111, L.23 – p.112, L.5.)  After 
considering the State’s offer of proof, the district court ruled “under Rule 404(b) that this 
information is, not just to prove the character of Mr. Sams, but it is admissible for 
another purpose including the identity or the absence of mistake or accident in this 
particular fact given the state’s offer of proof.”  (Tr., p.113, L.22 – p.114, L.1.)  Thus, the 
district court’s earlier ruling encompassed all the standoff evidence, including the 
evidence the district court later determined was not Rule 404(b) evidence. 
The district court’s ultimate determination was arbitrary and therefore outside the 
boundaries of the district court’s discretion.  The district court’s ruling that the standoff 
evidence was admissible as Rule 404(b) evidence stood until the court was presented 
with the State’s failure to serve notice, which would render the evidence inadmissible.  
See Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230.  The district court then determined the evidence was 
admissible because it was not Rule 404(b) evidence.  The district court’s flip-flopping on 
whether the standoff evidence was Rule 404(b) evidence was arbitrary, and thus 
outside the boundaries of the district court’s discretion. 
Because the district court’s ultimate determination that the standoff evidence was 
not Rule 404(b) evidence was outside the boundaries of the district court’s discretion, 
the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the standoff evidence.  See 
Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.  The standoff evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) 
because the State failed to serve notice.  See Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230. 
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F. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The District Court’s Error Was Harmless 
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
 
Mr. Sams asserts his judgment of conviction should be vacated and the case 
should be remanded because the State will be unable to prove the district court’s in 
admitting the standoff evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the 
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  See 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).  “To hold an error as harmless, an appellate 
court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable 
possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.”  State v. 
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 
The State will be unable to prove that the district court’s abuse of discretion was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Putting the standoff evidence aside, the State’s 
case was weak.  The State’s case largely rested on the testimony of the complaining 
witness, Mr. Ohlsson.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.343, Ls.15-16 (State’s contention in closing 
argument, on “[w]hat do know about what happened?  We have the testimony of 
Mr. Ohlsson.”)  Mr. Ohlsson was thoroughly impeached over the course of the trial.  As 
discussed above, while Mr. Ohlsson testified he did not have any sexual contact with 
Mr. Sams (Tr., p.159, Ls.8-12), Officer Linn testified Mr. Ohlsson told him there was 
some sexual contact.  (Tr., p.227, L.22 – p.228, L.8.)  Further, Mr. Ohlsson was 
impeached on what he wrote in his written statement about the incident (see Tr., p.160, 
L.23 – p.161, L.22), and on how his trial testimony on the order of events differed from 
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the order of events he testified to at the preliminary hearing (see Tr., p.164, L.2 – p.169, 
L.15.)  Mr. Ohlsson was even impeached on the nature of the Grindr app he used to 
contact Mr. Sams.  (Compare Tr., p.156, L.21 – p.157, L.9 (Mr. Ohlsson denying Grindr 
is a “hookup site”), with Tr., p.263, L.11 – p.264, L.2 (Mr. Sams explaining Grindr is 
primarily used for hookups).) 
Considering the weakness of the State’s case, it cannot be said the error in 
admitting the standoff evidence did not contribute to Mr. Sams’ conviction for disturbing 
the peace.  Even though the jury acquitted Mr. Sams on the original aggravated assault 
charge and the lesser-included assault charge, there was still a reasonable possibility 
the standoff evidence contributed to the conviction.  See State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70, 73-
74 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a district court’s error in instructing a jury on the 
elements of felony domestic violence was not harmless, “mindful that the jury did not 
entirely accept the state’s evidence presented at trial” because the jury acquitted the 
defendant on a kidnapping charge). 
The State will be unable to prove the district court’s in admitting the standoff 
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, Mr. Sams’ judgment of 




 For the above reasons, Mr. Sams respectfully requests this Court vacate his 
judgment of conviction and remand his case to the district court. 
 DATED this 29th day of February, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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